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Abstract
In this work, we introduce an active attack on a Group Key Exchange
protocol by Burmester and Desmedt. The attacker obtains a copy of the
shared key, which is created in a collaborative manner with the legal users
in a communication group.
1 Introduction
Group Key Exchange (GKE) has recently been a concern mainly due to the
huge development of multiparty communications that, nowadays, are applied in
many networks and, in most cases, with a very light infrastructure. For this
reason, distributed GKE, where members in a group collaborate to agree on a
common key, is becoming very popular and there exist many approaches trying
to provide effective protocols to this end (cf. [4] or [8] for example).
Some efficient solutions were introduced by Burmester and Desmedt in [1]
and [2] and by Steiner et al. in [6] and [7] that extend naturally the classical
Diffie-Hellman protocol ([3]). Both solutions were shown to be secure against
a passive adversary if the Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable. However, in
[5] the authors provide an active attack on one of Steiner et al.’s proposals
that allows an intrusion into the communicating group, assuming control of
communications of two particular parties only during the key exchange.
Motivated by this work, which exploits a weakness of the protocol consisting
of the possibility to ask one of the users like an oracle, we show a similar active
attack on Burmester and Desmedt’s proposal ([1] and [2]) that presents a simi-
lar weakness. In this case, our attack requires control of the communications of
only one user and, as in the case of [5], for only the duration of the key exchange,
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which is to say that after the attack, the attacker does not need to control com-
munications of this user to translate messages, since all users and the attacker
him/herself agree on a common key. We also note that since rekeying operation
in this case is carried out by rerunning the protocol completely, the attacker
can repeat the strategy (not necessarily on the same user) and keep listening to
all communications for an unlimited time.
The following sections describe the protocol introduced in [1] and [2] in an
algebraic group setting and the active attack respectively.
2 The Group Key Exchange protocol
Let Ui, i = 1, . . . , n be a set of parties that want to generate a shared key K.
Let G be a group of prime order q. The users agree on a generator g of G and
operate as follows:
Round 1. Each party Ui, i = 1, . . . , n, selects a random ri ∈ Zq and broadcasts
zi = g
ri .
Round 2. Each party Ui, i = 1, . . . , n, broadcasts Xi = (zi+1/zi−1)
ri .
Key Computations. Each party Ui, i = 1, . . . , n computes the key
Ki = (zi−1)
nri ·Xn−1i ·X
n−2
i+1 · · ·Xn+i−2 ∈ G.
In the above, indices should be interpreted modulo n. By [2, Lemma 3.1],
the users Ui, i = 1, . . . , n compute the same key K = g
r1r2+r2r3+···+rnr1 ∈ G.
3 The Attack
Under the conditions of the previous sections, let Ui, i = 1, . . . , n, be a set
of communicating parties and let A be an active attacker that is able to take
control of one of the users’ communications, let us say Uk. Then the attack is
developed as follows.
1. Each party Ui, i = 1, . . . , n, selects a random ri ∈ Zq and broadcasts
zi = g
ri as in round 1 of the protocol.
2. A stops rk and, forging Uk’s identity, sends to Ui, i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= k,
z′k = g
a, where a is such that a− 1 is invertible in Zq.
3. At the same time, A stops the message zk+1 for Uk and replaces it by
z′k+1 = z
a
k−1 = (g
rk−1)a.
4. Uk starts round 2 and computes Xk = (z
′
k+1/zk−1)
rk = (zrkk−1)
a−1, which
is broadcasted.
5. A stops Xk and Uk is waiting in round 2 to receive the remaining Xi,
i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= k.
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6. While Xk is waiting in round 2, A finishes running the GKE protocol with
participants Ui, i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= k, using A’s private information a. They
agree on a key K.
7. A computes b = (a− 1)−1 mod q and computes Xbk = z
rk
k−1.
8. A generates a list {h1, . . . , hn−3} of elements in G and provides Uk the list
{X1, . . . , Xk−1, Xk+1, . . . , Xn} given by
Xk+1 = z
−rk
k−1 h1,
Xk+j = h
−1
j−1hj , for j = 2, . . . , n− 3,
Xk−2 = K X
−(n−1)
k z
−2rk
k−1 h
−2
n−3
∏n−4
r=1 h
−1
r ,
where indices are again taken modulo n.
Remark 3.1. Let us note that Xk−1 could be any arbitrary element since this
is not used to compute Kk−1. However, in a proper execution of the protocol,
it holds that
∏n
i=1 Xi = 1. User Uk could check whether this holds. In order to
avoid being detected, once we have computed all Xi with i 6= 1, we can define
Xk−1 = (
∏n
i=1,i6=k−1 Xi)
−1.
Lemma 3.2. After the active attack, all users Ui, i = 1, . . . , n, and A share
the same key.
Proof. It is clear from step 6 that A and Ui, i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= k share the key K.
A straightforward computation shows that
Kk = (zk−1)
nrk ·Xn−1k ·X
n−2
k+1 · · ·Xn+k−2 = K.
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